The clock is ticking: Trump is not prepared to let politics in Israel stop the moves in the region

The unusual incident in southern Lebanon over the weekend provided a reminder of what could disrupt American plans in the region. Three IDF soldiers were seriously wounded in a Hezbollah attack, Israel responded with force, 11 Lebanese were killed, including civilians, and within hours Washington was required to deal again with the question that accompanies the contacts between Israel and Lebanon: how to move towards a settlement when a low-intensity war is still being waged on the ground.

The Americans accepted the Israeli explanation for the response, but in Jerusalem they know that this is not a blank check for the future. The fact that the Prime Minister's Office rushed to publish in English the news of the soldiers' injury during the Sabbath, even before the IDF announcement on the matter, testified to how worried it was about the reaction in Washington to the Lebanese deaths. The announcement in Hebrew was published only after the Sabbath ended. This timeline was not accidental: during the hours when Israel was being criticized for killing civilians, it was urgent for Netanyahu that the Israeli version reach the readers in the White House first. Shortly thereafter, the United States Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, adopted the Israeli explanation.

United States President Donald Trump wants to disarm Hezbollah and strengthen the Lebanese government no less than Benjamin Netanyahu. The disagreement between them is about the way and the order of operations.

From Israel's perspective, a settlement that does not prevent Hezbollah from returning to the area is a recipe for the next round. After October 7, it is difficult to convince the Israeli public to accept promises about a local force that will enter the area, international supervision, and a commitment by an armed organization to stay away from the border. Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz demand that the demilitarization be proven, that the Lebanese army actually control the situation, and that the IDF not give up its ability to act before it becomes clear that the model works.

Katz went a step further last week. During a tour of IDF positions in southern Lebanon, he announced that he had ordered the army to prepare for a "long-term presence" in the area. The American response was unusually clear: a permanent Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon is inconsistent with the commitments in the agreement. Behind the exchange of words lies a fundamental disagreement about the order of operations: Israel demands that the progress of the withdrawal be derived from the success of the demilitarization, while the Americans see the withdrawal as part of the process that is supposed to enable the demilitarization.

In Washington, they look at the same map and see a different problem. Trump wants to translate military achievements into political settlements. In Lebanon, there is already a framework agreement: dismantling Hezbollah, deploying the Lebanese army, and a gradual Israeli withdrawal. After seven rounds of talks mediated by the US, and another round planned for the beginning of September in Rome, the Americans want to see execution. The pilot zones are intended for exactly this - to test on the ground whether the Lebanese army is capable of taking control of an area that the IDF has evacuated, dismantling the military infrastructure, and not allowing Hezbollah to return.

Israeli politics has already become part of the political equation. Israel has less than two and a half months left until the elections. Netanyahu cannot afford to be seen as someone who hands over territory based on Lebanese commitments alone. From his point of view, a picture of Israeli tanks leaving southern Lebanon before it is possible to present a real dismantling of Hezbollah is political dynamite. Trump approaches this issue with a different interest: he seeks to complete settlements, and Lebanon is for him one of the links in a much larger regional move.

On Trump's list of goals are also promoting the Gaza plan, a security agreement between Israel and Syria, getting the crisis with Iran out of the current stalemate - and above all, an attempt to reach a historic agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. In the White House, they understand that the elections in Israel could freeze all these tracks.

The fear is not theoretical: Trump's people remember well the political crisis in Israel in 2019, which led to three consecutive election campaigns and a year lost in terms of regional diplomacy. This memory is particularly tangible for Trump: during his first term, his peace plan was rejected again and again against the backdrop of the political deadlock in Israel. This time, there is no intention in Washington to allow Israeli politics to stop Trump's agenda again.

The American attitude towards Netanyahu in recent times is largely derived from the distinction between the needs of his campaign and his actual decisions. After Netanyahu publicly rejected the Peace Council's plan for the demilitarization of Hamas, the Americans interpreted the remarks largely as election-period politics. The message conveyed to him was much more practical: in Washington, they are willing to contain some of the rhetoric as long as Israel restrains the attacks and allows the process to move forward. Indeed, after a conversation with Jared Kushner, Netanyahu promised to give the plan a chance and reduce activity in Gaza.

But this space of tolerance is not unlimited. In Lebanon, the West Bank, and Syria, events and statements have accumulated in recent days that have caused discomfort even among elements in the administration considered very close to Israel. Huckabee, a declared friend of the settlement enterprise, was required to address the violence against Palestinians in Qusra and the Israeli handling of it; and at the same time, in Washington, they did not like the sequence of statements in Israel against Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, in whom Trump has invested political capital.

These are not crises in themselves, but they are accumulating at a moment when the American president is asking Jerusalem for mainly one thing: not to interfere with the moves he is trying to promote in the region.

The gap in the schedules is therefore also political. A first withdrawal, the transfer of territory to the Lebanese army, and the start of the pilot project may be recorded in Washington as political progress, and in Israel used by those who will argue that Netanyahu withdrew too early. Israeli insistence on remaining in the area until full demilitarization will serve Netanyahu's argument of determination, but may be perceived in the White House as a delay of the agreement.

Beirut also has its own clock. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Najib Mikati took a political risk when they agreed to move forward in a process whose goal is to return the monopoly on weapons to the state. But it is difficult for them to dismantle Hezbollah when the IDF continues to hold Lebanese territory and attack in the country. Any attack in which civilians are killed strengthens Hezbollah's argument: why hand over the weapons when Israel is still attacking?

Hezbollah understands this contradiction well and tries to exploit it. From its point of view, a settlement in which it disarms before an Israeli withdrawal is a strategic loss. Therefore, it demands to reverse the order of operations: first Israel leaves, then it is possible to talk about the weapons. Iran, which has lost a significant part of its regional power levers in recent years, is not interested in easily giving up the most important Lebanese asset it has left. From Tehran's point of view, dismantling Hezbollah will damage the main deterrence mechanism it has built against Israel over decades.

Netanyahu's political situation further complicates the American calculation. His current coalition is far from the 61 mandates needed to form a government. From his point of view, even preventing a majority for the rival camp may be enough: if no one succeeds in forming a government, he will remain in office as prime minister of a transitional government until further elections. This possibility particularly worries Washington, because it means more months in which Trump's regional agenda might wait for Israeli politics.

Trump also has a personal political lever over Netanyahu. So far, he has refrained from giving him the public support in the elections that the Prime Minister hoped for. When they met at the White House about two weeks ago, Trump even asked him directly about his situation in the polls. Netanyahu hesitated, and one of his advisors rushed to answer the President that he is "winning". The data tells a different story. On four different occasions in recent weeks, Trump was asked if he supports Netanyahu, and in all of them he evaded expressing explicit support.

This avoidance has additional meaning because of the history between the two. Trump has already proven in the past that he is willing to throw his full weight into an Israeli election campaign: days before the April 2019 elections, he recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan, a move he himself later boasted helped Netanyahu. This time, at least for now, he is keeping this card to himself.

The Israeli opposition also understands the value of this card. Sources in the circles of Gadi Eizenkot, Naftali Bennett, and Yair Lapid have in recent months conveyed messages to Trump's people, through acquaintances, donors, and political allies, and asked him to remain neutral in the elections. This activity shows how much Trump's position has become a component of the Israeli election campaign, even before he decided whether to intervene in it.

Personal relations between the two have not been severed. American officials describe Trump as someone who likes Netanyahu, but is increasingly frustrated by his decisions. Recently, Trump was even quoted in private conversations as saying that Netanyahu is "his own biggest enemy". At the same time, support for Israel in part of Trump's policy has weakened following the agreement with Iran and the restrictions the administration imposed on Israel's freedom of action in Iran, Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon. Trump also has his own political limitation: too aggressive an intervention in the elections in Israel could damage his status among the public that in the past gave him almost automatic support.

Lebanon is not the only arena where this gap is being tested. In Gaza, the White House seeks to promote the Peace Council's plan; in Syria, Washington is investing in President Ahmad al-Sharaa, and in Israel, harsh statements are heard against him; and over Iran, the question still hangs whether the crisis will end in an agreement or another round. Kushner, Nickolay Mladenov, and Tony Blair are arriving in the region this week to promote the move in Gaza. From their point of view, this is expected to be the first issue on the agenda with Netanyahu. Israeli action in one of these arenas could complicate an American move in another.

There is currently no basis for the assessment that Trump is about to become an adversary of Israel or Netanyahu. The risk for the Prime Minister is that an American president who is convinced that the time for deals has come will start to attribute to Jerusalem an increasing share of the responsibility for delaying them. Trump still holds other cards that Netanyahu may need as the elections approach - from expressing public support to another move regarding President Isaac Herzog on the issue of a pardon. For now, he is not using them. As the elections approach, Netanyahu's room for maneuver in the face of American demands also shrinks.

Two towns in southern Lebanon will be the first practical test of this gap. If the Lebanese army enters the pilot zones, dismantles Hezbollah's infrastructure, and this is verified in a way that Israel can rely on, the result will serve both leaders: Trump will be able to present progress in the settlement, and Netanyahu will be able to claim that the withdrawal was carried out only after the other side met the conditions. The failure of the pilot project will strengthen the Israeli argument that the caution was justified. If the pilot project does not get underway at all because Israel refuses to withdraw, on the other hand, in Washington they might start asking not only if Lebanon is capable of dismantling Hezbollah, but if Jerusalem is willing to do its part in the settlement that Trump seeks to complete.