A state is not created by recognition: between image and governing capacity

Prof. Daniel Friedman presents a fascinating argument in his article this morning on Ynet: The State of Palestine already exists in practice, even if it is a "disabled state." According to him, many countries recognize it, international institutions treat it as a state entity, and it already enjoys some of the powers granted by international recognition. From this, Friedman concludes that the question is no longer whether a Palestinian state will arise, but how Israel will deal with a fait accompli.

There is no doubt that Friedman points to a real phenomenon: in recent years, the diplomatic status of the Palestinian Authority and the idea of a Palestinian state has strengthened. International institutions are granting it an increasing status, and many countries recognize it. Israel indeed cannot ignore this change in the international system. However, the conclusion derived from this is problematic. It confuses two completely different concepts: international legitimacy and effective sovereignty.

A state is not just an idea existing in the minds of people, in legal documents, or in UN votes. A state is first and foremost a mechanism capable of governing: controlling its territory, enforcing law, providing security for its citizens, collecting taxes, and holding a monopoly on the use of force. In this test, the Palestinian problem is not the lack of recognition. The problem is the lack of governing capacity.

Between a formal and an effective state

Political science distinguishes between a formal state and an effective state. A formal state is an entity recognized through documents, treaties, and international recognition. An effective state is one that is capable of exercising sovereignty in practice. History knows quite a few entities that gained international recognition but struggled to become stable states. Recognition can grant diplomatic legitimacy, but it does not create institutions of government, does not build a civil society, and does not guarantee that someone will control the weapons.

This gap is exactly the place where Friedman's argument weakens. The fact that an international system recognizes a state that does not fulfill all the basic conditions of a state does not prove that the state exists in practice; it sometimes proves the tension existing between international law and political reality. Will someone who struggles to govern a limited territory be able to manage a state?

The Palestinian Authority has existed since the Oslo Accords for over thirty years. It has gained wide recognition and, above all, enormous international economic aid, to the point of addiction to grants, donations, and monetary gifts, and to the building of security mechanisms. However, despite all this, it struggles to govern fully even in areas where it has defined powers. It is not by chance that the PA Chairman Abu Mazen is called the "Mayor of Ramallah." In large parts of Judea and Samaria, the PA faces the weakening of its authority, the strengthening of armed groups, and a decline in public trust.

The obvious question is: if the Authority struggles to govern a limited territory and a relatively small population, how will it be able to manage a full state that includes borders, an economy, foreign relations, and an independent security system? International recognition does not solve the problem of governance. It only gives it a legal wrapping. In all parameters of "the Palestinian state" (the five tests), the Palestinians receive a failing grade.

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The five tests of statehood

1. Lack of monopoly on force. The most basic principle of a modern state, as defined by Max Weber, is the legitimate monopoly on the use of force. However, the Palestinian reality presents an opposite picture. For years, armed organizations with independent military capability existed alongside the Palestinian Authority. In Gaza, Hamas was effectively a "state within a state": possessing a military wing, security mechanisms, collection systems, and an independent control array. A state in which an ideological armed force can undermine the authority of the government is not a full sovereign state.

2. Crisis of internal legitimacy. A state needs not only institutions but also internal agreement on the rules of the game. The Palestinian system has suffered for years from a crisis of legitimacy. The Palestinian Authority struggles to present an agreed-upon political mechanism, while Hamas succeeded in building a support base for itself through a combination of ideology, resistance to Israel, and welfare mechanisms.

3. Weakness of government institutions. A stable state requires a functioning judicial system, professional public administration, enforcement mechanisms, and an economy with an independent base. International aid can help, but it cannot replace institutions. The experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya showed that financial investments and international recognition are not enough when there is no stable institutional and social base.

4. The split between Gaza and Judea and Samaria. One of the central problems is that the Palestinian system never managed to overcome the political and geographical split. Since Hamas's takeover of Gaza in 2007, there have effectively been two entities: one under the Palestinian Authority and the second under Hamas. One state needs one law, one leadership, and one security force.

5. Transition from a liberation movement to a state. One of the biggest challenges is the transition from a consciousness of national struggle to a consciousness of state-building. Many national movements in the world went through such a process: after achieving independence, they were required to replace the culture of struggle with the building of institutions, economy, and civil society. A state cannot be based only on resistance to an external enemy; it must define for itself how it manages its life from within.

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The lesson of October 7 is exactly this: an entity with territory, population, and military mechanisms is not necessarily a responsible state. It can become a power base of an ideological organization that seeks to wage war instead of building a society. Regarding Gaza, Friedman rightly points to the paradox: Gaza was for years under relatively full Palestinian control, but did not gain recognition as a state. In contrast, the Palestinian Authority gains international status even though it does not control all the territory attributed to it.

Europe is not a simple example for comparison. Friedman rightly mentions that peoples who fought each other for hundreds of years eventually managed to reach peace. However, the comparison to Europe misses a central component. The peace between France and Germany was not created only because both sides got tired of wars. It became possible after deep changes: building democratic institutions, rejecting extreme nationalism, historical reconciliation, and accepting the very existence of the other side. The Israeli-Palestinian question is not yet at this point.

Everyone should know - recognition is not a substitute for state-building. There is no doubt that the international status of the Palestinian state has strengthened. Israel cannot ignore this. However, one must not confuse a diplomatic change with a change in the strategic reality. A state is not created because enough countries recognize it. A state is created when there is a leadership capable of governing, a society willing to accept its institutions, and a government holding a monopoly on force. Therefore, the real question is not whether the world will recognize the State of Palestine. It is very possible that it will do so. The more important question is: will it be a state capable of governing on the day after recognition, or just a new name for an old problem?

The author, a Ph.D. and Colonel (res.), is an orientalist who served as the Governor of Jenin, Governor of Bethlehem, and Head of Security Coordination with the PA.