Everyone promised a restart after October 7 - and then went back to fighting over chairs | Prof. Moshe Cohen-Eliya

Remember how immediately after October 7 everyone talked about the need for an Israeli "restart"? It was clear to all of us then that it is impossible to simply return to October 6: not in security, not in law, not in academia, and not in the way the state makes decisions. October 7 was not just a failure of certain individuals. It exposed deeper weaknesses in management culture, in the structure of responsibility, and in systems that for years made decisions based on assumptions that turned out to be wrong.

Therefore, it is so disappointing to read the headlines surrounding the upcoming elections to understand how quickly we returned to petty politics: who is at the head — Gantz and not Simchi; who is in second place — Edelstein and not Erdan; who will get the right of first refusal for a portfolio — Shaked before Gantz; or perhaps all this is intended to secure a spot in the Likud. The center bloc looks more and more like a job arrangement for professional politicians who did not find their place in existing frameworks. There is no new idea there, no new perception of the state, and above all, no answer to the question of what exactly needs to change after October 7.

That is the problem. A real new party that claims to restart Israel cannot begin with the question of who will be number one and who will be number two. It must begin with the question of what kind of country we want to build.

In my opinion, there is a real justification in Israel for a liberal-right party. There is a large public that is right-wing on matters of security, nationalism, and sovereignty, but also liberal regarding individual liberty, the economy, science, technology, and equal opportunity. A public that wants a Jewish and secure state, but also a modern, competitive, and free one. However, such a party must be one. If four or five lists arise competing for the same space, each built around an ego, a familiar name, or a politician looking for a new home, they will miss the very reason why they were needed.

And the deep question that such a party must pose is the question of sovereignty: who determines the rules of the game in Israel and who bears responsibility when they fail. This is the fundamental question that stands at the center of the debate in Israel regarding the change of hegemony that we have been experiencing in recent years.

From the Second Aliyah onwards, the hegemony of the Labor movement grew here. From the thirties, Mapai became the central force in the institutions of the Yishuv and later in the state. It did not just win elections; it shaped the institutions, the culture, and the hegemonic version of Zionism. Its historical achievements were immense. Ben-Gurion and his generation established a state almost out of nothing.

But institutions change more slowly than societies. Even after the Labor movement lost political power, significant parts of the civil service, the judicial system, academia, and the media continued to largely reflect the social and ideological world of the old hegemony.

Israel of 2026 is already different. The Mizrahi, traditional, and religious public occupies a much more central place, and the demographic, cultural, and political center of gravity has changed. However, institutional power has not always changed at the same pace. Part of the constitutional and political crisis we are experiencing is exactly this tension: the gap between Israel's social structure and its power structure.

I am not trying to argue here that professional institutions are enemies of democracy. On the contrary: a serious democracy needs independent courts, a professional civil service, free academia, and critical media. But professional independence does not give these institutions a blank check to take our sovereignty away. Because when unelected institutions move from limiting power to shaping policy, the question of boundaries becomes a democratic question of the highest order.

Therefore, the change of hegemony should not be a project of revenge, nor should it be the replacement of one elite with another that will look out for itself. The new hegemony needs a serving elite of a different kind: connected to the roots but facing the future; national but liberal; respecting tradition but not imposing it; believing in the sovereignty of the people but also in professionalism, integrity, and excellence.

Herzl called his vision "Altneuland": an old-new land. And this is also our challenge: to take from the old the people, the land, the tradition, mutual responsibility, and sovereignty, and connect them to the new — that is, to liberty, equal opportunity, the competitive economy, science, technology, and artificial intelligence.

At the end of the Torah, the people already have an identity, a law, and a covenant, but they still do not have full sovereignty in the land. And then it is said to Joshua: "Moses My servant is dead. Now therefore arise, go over this Jordan." This is the moment of transition from vision to responsibility. Israel is also at such a moment. So the question is not just who will win the upcoming elections, but what political and social order will grow from the great crisis we have gone through. Will we get more lists of familiar politicians dividing seats among themselves, or new leadership that will offer the state a new direction.

So there is a justification for a liberal-right party. But there is a justification for only one, and one that starts with an idea, not a chair. Because one does not need to start over again. Rather, one needs to start from the beginning.