It all starts in Hormuz: The scenario that could ignite a world war | Dan Perry
This is how the crisis with Iran could quickly deteriorate into a massive campaign spanning from the Red Sea, through Eastern Europe, to the Pacific Ocean.
The war between the USA and Iran began as a regional conflict with global economic consequences. It is possible that this is how it will end: unfortunately, Iran seems determined not to give up control of the Strait of Hormuz and is trying to enlist Oman on its side — and the USA, which did not prepare at all for the surprisingly predictable situation, might give in. But there are other possibilities — and one of the scenarios is very similar to a world war, no less.
Giving in to the Iranians, while building pipelines and other infrastructure that would bypass the strait and the Bab el-Mandeb, which is at the mercy of the Houthis, would constitute an American defeat even if Donald Trump declares otherwise. But the USA might also decide that it cannot live with the humiliation, and here lies the danger of escalation. Existing friction points — Ukraine, the Gulf, Yemen, Lebanon, and Taiwan — could feed into each other. Like in 1914, a series of decisions by distant powers, each of which seems logical in itself, could lead to an international disaster that no one planned.
Let's assume the current situation continues. The two maritime access routes to the Arabian Peninsula are effectively blocked, and the global economic consequences are accumulating. Every additional week of disruptions raises insurance premiums, lengthens shipping routes, fuels global inflation, and harms markets — from fertilizers to jet fuel.
The USA reconciles with NATO, and with the organization's backing, takes control of Kharg Island, Iran's critical oil terminal, and Qeshm Island, essential for its control of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran does not surrender and fires on ships from further away. The West begins to examine how to exert greater pressure not only on Iran itself but also on the proxy organizations.
Houthis are the most immediate problem. They can paralyze traffic in the Suez Canal and deprive Egypt of foreign currency it desperately needs. There is a good chance that NATO will this time be enlisted to help the Saudis and the Egyptians.
And then there is Hezbollah. What has been perceived for years as an Israeli problem only is reframed as an effort to restore Lebanese sovereignty, with the help of Syria. The pro-Iranian militias in Iraq are a third front: as they increase their attacks on American facilities and coalition supply lines, Washington reinforces its presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. There is a complication: Turkey, a NATO member, loathes the Kurds, and now it has a defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It is unclear how all this fits together.
The counter-coalition is forming
Russia, China, and North Korea understand that they have a common strategic interest: none of them wants to see the Iranian regime collapse under American military pressure, with the USA exiting the Gulf with increased influence over one of the world's most important energy routes. They all also understand that a prolonged confrontation drains resources that Washington could have directed to other arenas.
Beijing can simply expand the supply of dual-use electronics, industrial equipment, drones, missile technologies, satellite assistance, financial support, and intelligence, while simultaneously granting Iran diplomatic protection against attempts in the UN Security Council to legitimize broader military action.
As for Moscow, the military partnership already forged with Tehran during the war in Ukraine deepens even further, as Russia expands the supply of air defense systems, electronic warfare capabilities, intelligence, advisors, and advanced military technologies.
North Korea integrates naturally, having already proven its willingness to exchange artillery ammunition, ballistic missiles, and manpower — for Russian economic aid and advanced military technology. Thus, an axis is created whose members help each other because each of them benefits from the erosion of the military and political capacity of the USA and its allies.
The wars begin to merge
As the crisis in the Middle East continues, the temptation for rival powers to exploit the American distraction for their own seemingly unrelated needs grows. Ukraine has stabilized the front and developed the ability to strike deep into Russia's military economy. Long-range drone strikes cause increasing damage to oil infrastructure, defense production, and other strategic targets, turning Russia's vast geography from a strength into a military weakness — because it is difficult to defend it all. However, the war in the Middle East takes a toll on Kyiv: stocks of air defense interceptor missiles, precision-guided munitions, and long-range missiles are diverted to the defense of the Gulf and the Red Sea, and less to Ukraine.
Vladimir Putin responds by increasing missile and drone attacks, supplemented by North Korean ballistic missiles, calculating that the depletion of Kyiv's interceptor missile stocks leaves it more exposed. Ukraine, concluding that it is no longer possible to separate the wars, expands its operations against Iranian assets supporting the Russian war effort. For the first time, success or failure in one arena directly affects the balance in another.
The Kremlin identifies an opportunity. After more than four years of attrition, America, increasingly committed to the Persian Gulf, and Europe, whose weapons depots are stretched across several arenas, become vulnerable. Russia launches its largest offensive since the first months of the invasion, and simultaneously increases pressure along NATO's eastern border through Belarus and Kaliningrad — its enclave between Lithuania and Poland.
If Ukraine seems close to collapse, European governments conclude that arms shipments are no longer enough. Air defense units, engineers, intelligence assets, and finally combat troops begin to enter Ukraine as part of one coalition or another. An open confrontation between Russia and European NATO members follows.
Then China also identifies an opportunity. An increasing naval blockade of Taiwan tests the resolve of the USA and exerts immense economic pressure on the island. Washington cannot stand by. American naval and air forces are poured into the Western Pacific, alongside Japanese and Australian support. Resources urgently needed in Europe and the Middle East are now competing with equally urgent demands in East Asia.
The red button
Europe is fighting Russia over the future of Ukraine and the security of NATO's eastern front. The USA and Japan are trying to prevent the forcible annexation of Taiwan, while maintaining freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific. American and coalition forces remain deeply involved in the Middle East, in an attempt to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea while containing Iran and its network of regional proxies. North Korea helps Russia, China holds Iran, and Arab governments align more and more with the Western coalition because their own economies depend on the renewal of maritime trade.
Israel occupies an exceptional place in this coalition: militarily essential thanks to its intelligence, technology, and operational experience, but politically uncomfortable for everyone (this also depends on the election results here, because Benjamin Netanyahu is completely ostracized).
And the confrontation expands far beyond the battlefields — and does not require kinetic combat in every arena. Cyberattacks disrupt financial systems, ports, power grids, and communication infrastructure. Intelligence agencies conduct an aggressive secret war, including sabotage, espionage, and influence operations. The distinction between the battlefield and the home front is being erased, as governments mobilize economic, technological, and financial resources on a scale not seen for generations.
Terrorist attacks against American, European, or allied targets become an increasingly likely possibility. Politically, it is almost irrelevant whether such attacks are directed by governments, encouraged through proxy organizations, or simply inspired by the wider confrontation. Public opinion in the democratic world begins to demand a sharper response, broader military actions, and more ambitious political goals. A large enough attack could trigger hysteria. Talk of nuclear weapons is no longer a taboo.
Thus, a war that began with a tweet by President Trump after a massacre of protesters turns into a global strategic struggle spanning from the Red Sea to Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific. None of the great powers set out with the intention of starting a world war. Each of them simply took what seemed to be a logical response to the immediate crises facing them. It does not have to develop this way. A comprehensive blockade of Iran might still prove to be a preferable alternative to a world war — or a shameful surrender.
The author is the former chief editor of the AP news agency in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, and the author of books about Israel.



