The Illusion of Stability: Why Are We Surprised by the Arab States' 'Temporary Peace Advice'?
A censored report about a country that recommended its neighbor sign a peace agreement with Israel now in order to fight it in the future has caused a stir and raised the question: 'Must we live by our sword forever?' However, the idea of a temporary arrangement for tactical purposes is embedded in Islamic tradition and was part of the approach of Arafat and Mashaal. Instead of fostering illusions of a sustainable peace, Israel must manage risks, maintain strategic assets, and adopt a 'Hudna logic' of its own. Commentary.
Under censorship constraints, a report echoed this week about a country in the region that recommended another country reach a peace arrangement with Israel now, and in the future — at an appropriate time — launch a war against it. This report touched a raw nerve of the Israeli longing for arrangements and peace agreements with the countries of the region, and raised again the worrying question: Must we live by our sword forever?
Looking more realistically, it is not at all clear what is new in that report. If only we had listened to the neighbors who wish for the destruction of the State of Israel, and if we had known the roots of the Islamic tradition in its approach to 'peace arrangements' — based on the cunning of 'Taqiyya' and the idea of Hudna — there would have been no new discovery in this report.
One does not negotiate over an eternal vision
What is difficult for Israelis and 'rational' Westerners to understand is that even when a person with faith and an eternal vision comes to negotiations, he does not for a moment place the vision and the national dream as a subject for compromise.
Thus, for example, in the 'Johannesburg speech' delivered about half a year after the signing of the Oslo Accords (May 1994), Yasser Arafat presented the agreement as the 'Hudaybiyyah agreement' of the Prophet Muhammad — that is, a temporary agreement that is destined to be violated at the appropriate time.
Similarly, Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal explained his approach to the two-state solution after Operation 'Cloud Pillar' in November 2012: 'Our agreement in Hamas on a state within the '67 borders... there are those who worry that perhaps this is a loophole in which the great dream will diminish. And I say no. I believe that the liberation of Palestine within the '67 borders is now a practical goal... Whoever liberates Palestine within the '67 borders from Israel's hands will subsequently liberate the rest of Palestine.'
Well, national-religious dreams are not negotiated. What likely causes Israelis to consistently ignore a wide range of such repeated declarations is the Jewish trait of denial that allowed Jews to survive throughout all the years of exile.
Ben-Gurion's stage theory
It is interesting to identify that in the struggle for the establishment of the State of Israel, David Ben-Gurion had a conduct with a bold and not naive procedural logic, which in fact inspired the Palestinian stage theory.
When Ben-Gurion agreed in 1937 to the partition of the land according to the Peel Commission's outline, he explained it well: 'This Jewish state proposed to us now... is not the Zionist goal. In this area, there is no possibility to solve the Jewish question. However, it will establish in the shortest time the real Jewish power that will bring us subsequently to our historical destination.' This is a distinct strategy of a stage theory — an uncompromising pursuit of the realization of a national dream in a process directed toward an eternal vision.
In this view, the advice to that Arab country to go with Israel for a peace arrangement as a stage in a long-term strategic plan relies on an ancient logic in strategic existence. The amazed Israeli reference to this report is what causes bewilderment.
Risk management: Adopting an Israeli 'Hudna logic'
The excessive Israeli interest in that report stems from the complex strategic context in which the state is currently located. After almost three years of war, when all fronts are still open and the reservists are exhausted to the limit of their ability, there is room for the aspiration and request for political arrangements for the proper end of the war.
However, this report has paramount importance in guiding Israeli expectations: it must be assumed that everything is charged with elements of cunning. This does not mean avoiding efforts for arrangement, but it is mandatory to remember that one should not hang expectations on them for guaranteed agreements that will not be violated later.
This awareness has practical implications for Israel's risk management considerations and for the possible space of flexibility. It requires, for example, a firm stand on the meaning of vital territories — such as the 'Seventy Ridge' in the Gaza Strip — necessary for the defense of the border communities.
Also for the State of Israel, there exists the possibility to adopt a 'Hudna logic': a conscious assumption that in all dimensions everything here is temporary and requires readiness for crises and sudden escalation. In this understanding, even useful alliances with neighbors are prone to dissolution and are tested every day anew. The belief in sustainable strategic stability is, in this aspect, a dangerous illusion.
