The time has come for a "Mossad Law"
No security system, however skilled and creative it may be, has a guarantee of eternal success. Failures have always existed and always will. The Shin Bet did not prevent all the attacks initiated by our enemies; books have already been written about the IDF's failures on October 7. And in the Mossad, too, there are human beings prone to error.
In March 1998, as Minister of Justice, I brought the "General Security Service Law" proposal to the Knesset for discussion and a vote. We initiated the law in order to correct an inappropriate reality that had existed since the founding of the state, whereby the operational methods of a secret and powerful intelligence organization were not regulated by primary legislation. In my opening remarks for the discussion in the Knesset plenum, I clarified that:
"Security services have many and varied powers, and within them lies the potential for real harm to privacy, freedom, and the body. Since the activities of these organizations are by nature secret and protected, control mechanisms such as free media, parliamentary oversight, public opinion, and judicial review are ineffective. Therefore, it is of great importance to establish legal arrangements for the oversight of the activities of the security services."
The Shin Bet Law received support from all parts of the House, and after a series of in-depth discussions in the plenum and Knesset committees, it was passed in three readings and entered the law books of the State of Israel. During the parliamentary debate, MK Ophir Pines-Paz suggested "thinking with all seriousness also about legislating a Mossad Law... It is true that the Mossad operates abroad and the Shin Bet in the country, but I still think that most of the parameters that appear in the Shin Bet Law, there is no reason they cannot be in a Mossad Law, especially the issue of supervision and control."
MK Pines-Paz was right in his words, and that is how I answered him from the Knesset podium. However, unlike the consensus that characterized the discussion on the Shin Bet Law, the security echelons clearly expressed reservations about legislation that would regulate the operation of the "Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks" (Mossad). In discussions I held with senior officials of the Ministry of Justice and representatives of the security agencies, doubts were raised regarding the need to draw an equal line between the Mossad and the Shin Bet.
The main argument of those who dissented stemmed from the difference in the areas of responsibility of the two organizations. The General Security Service is tasked with duties that require extensive and broad activity within Israeli society. In contrast, the Mossad operates outside Israel's borders. The intelligence and operational activity of the Mossad takes place in foreign countries, usually under cover, and is by its nature illegal in those countries. In any case, Israeli legislation cannot legalize offenses according to the laws of those countries, and a Mossad agent who is exposed, God forbid, in Iran or another enemy state will not be helped by the legitimacy granted to his actions by the Knesset of Israel.
A government initiative to legislate a "Mossad Law" did not come to fruition then, nor in the decades that have passed since. Over the years, such private bills have been placed on the Knesset table, but they too have not gained any momentum. The events of recent years, and also the events of recent months, require a rethink of this matter. Its purpose is to re-evaluate the logic that separates the IDF, the General Security Service, and the National Security Council, for all of which the Knesset has dedicated a special law, from the Mossad, which remains the only security organization whose activity is not anchored in law.
The war that broke out in October 2023 exposed to the citizens of Israel the unique and sensitive capabilities of Mossad operatives. The legendary pager operation and the execution of targeted killings far from the country's borders gave Israelis a thrilling glimpse beyond the realms of imagination. But sadly, no security system, however skilled and creative it may be, has a guarantee of eternal success. Failures have always existed and always will. The Shin Bet did not prevent all the attacks initiated by our enemies; books have already been written about the IDF's failures on October 7. And in the Mossad, too, there are human beings prone to error.
The fact that even the best among us are not immune to glitches and mistakes does not exempt the State of Israel from the duty to establish oversight systems for its security institutions. The status that the Mossad has gained in recent years requires changing the approach that has accepted for 77 years its remaining outside the scope of Israeli legislation. The change is not simple, but the ambiguous situation must change. This is one of the challenges that the next Knesset must address.
