Likud wants to dismantle Eisenkot. Meanwhile, it is only building him up

It is no secret that strategists stand behind politics. Behind every change of Bennett's shirt from button-down to t-shirt, every photo of a candidate, every message in an interview, every word in a video, and even every dot in an ad, there is a political strategy. Almost nothing is accidental. And those who have been considered for years the best of the best in the field are the campaign staff of Likud and Netanyahu. They know how to identify an opponent, mark a weakness, attach a label, fix a perception, and manage an agenda.

And precisely because of this, in recent weeks, quite a few people in the political system have looked at the Likud campaign and asked: what on earth are they doing? How can it be that Likud and Netanyahu decided to run a campaign on Gadi Eisenkot's head?

The campaign against Eisenkot is one of two things: either an infantile and stupid move that will eventually get a failing grade, or a much more sophisticated move than it currently appears, which may yet end with a commendation.

Because on the face of it, attacking Gadi Eisenkot is a decision almost devoid of political logic. Eisenkot is wrapped in an especially thick layer of Teflon. A kid from the periphery who grew up in Eilat, a fighter and commander in Golani who reached the office of the Chief of Staff, a man perceived as a statesman, moderate and pleasant — and above all, a bereaved father who lost his son in the war. In Israeli society, and certainly after October 7, this is almost holy of holies.

One can argue with Eisenkot. One can dismantle his political plan. One can pull out old quotes. But to turn him into a demon of the left? That is a much more complicated task.

And above all, any novice strategist should first ask one question: who is the target audience? Whom do Likud and the right-wing bloc need to bring back home? Not the voters of Agudat Yisrael, not the voters of Hadash-Ta'al, and not the hard base of the Democrats. The elections may rise and fall on four, six, maybe eight mandates of the soft right: right-wingers who were disappointed, former religious, national-religious, reservists, graduates of pre-military academies. People who are debating between Smotrich and Hendel and Tropper, between Likud and Eisenkot.

And these people do not necessarily live inside the archive. They do not sit at night analyzing the nuances between a quote from Eisenkot from eight years ago and his quote from 12 years ago. For a large part of them, a Chief of Staff from Golani and a bereaved father is not "left". He is a model of the Israeli-ness on which they themselves grew up.

It is very difficult to go for his head. Who is capable of moving them back to the right? Yair Golan.

Almost every extreme statement by Golan is a gift to the right-wing bloc. A threat to the Eli pre-military academy? A few more votes returning to Smotrich. An unsuccessful remark about babies as a hobby? Another video for the campaign. Sweeping accusations against the settlement enterprise around "Jewish terror"? A few more soft right-wingers who remember why, with all their anger at the government, it is hard for them to cross the lines.

Even Avigdor Lieberman expressed this week the great expectation from Golan: simply to be quiet. Not because he is shouting, but because when he speaks, he might drive right-wing voters back to the coalition bloc.

And therefore, strategic consultants have begun in recent weeks to despise the people of Likud. They claimed that the magic has faded, that the machine has lost direction, that the obvious opponent is right in front of them — and instead of focusing on him, they continue to hit Eisenkot.

Worse than that from their perspective: the attacks did not bite into Eisenkot. At least until now, they have not succeeded in stopping his strengthening. The man who was in the single-digit zone in the polls is already climbing far beyond that, and every attack on him only places him again at the center of the arena.

But in Likud, they claim there is a method to the madness. According to their thesis, most of the Israeli public is moving to the right, and therefore almost everyone today wants to be perceived as right-wing. Including Eisenkot.

From Likud's perspective, the moment when the statement of his close advisor Ronen Manelis about what needs to be done to "look right-wing" was etched in was a gift. Manelis did not mean to say that Eisenkot should dress up as a right-winger; the intention was about the issues that need to be talked about. But in politics, the intention does not always matter anymore. The sentence was etched.

And this, they say in Likud, was the first stage. In recent weeks, they tried to undermine the brand itself: to convince right-wing voters that Eisenkot is not really right-wing. That he might look like a statesman, security-minded, and a Golani guy, but behind the packaging lies a different worldview.

Now the second stage is supposed to arrive: the partners. Yair Golan. Mansour Abbas. And everyone whom Likud can connect to Eisenkot to ask the soft right-wing voter not only "Who is Gadi Eisenkot?", but a much more effective question: "With whom will Gadi Eisenkot form a government?"

And here lies perhaps the true logic of the campaign.

Because it is doubtful if it is possible at all to re-engineer the political identity of people like Naftali Bennett, Avigdor Lieberman, Matan Kahana, or Yulia Malinovsky. One can be angry at them, one can despise them politically, but it is hard to convince a right-wing voter that they have suddenly become leftists who dream of evacuating settlements and signing a peace agreement with Mahmoud Abbas / Abu Mazen and Khalil al-Hayya.

Therefore, the real battle will probably not be over the question of who among them is "right-wing enough". The battle will be over the bloc. Likud will try to tell the undecided voter: it may be that Eisenkot looks okay to you. It may be that Bennett and Lieberman are also right-wing in your eyes. But look at who will have to complete their government. That is already a much stronger argument.

However, at the moment Likud has a problem: the first stage did not work.

The campaign did not shrink Eisenkot. On the contrary. It gave him attention, made him the main opponent of Netanyahu, and to some extent even enlarged him.

Now comes the real test for those who are considered the best strategists in the political system. Were the last few weeks a fundamental mistake in choosing the opponent — a useless attempt to turn a Golani guy, a Chief of Staff, and a bereaved father into a demon of the left? Or was everything we saw just preparing the ground, and the real campaign is starting now: not Eisenkot himself, but the people with whom he will have to form a government.