The bomb behind the Abraham Accords: Why Israel must say "no" to Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia's accession to the Abraham Accords could be one of the most important political achievements in Israel's history. Normalization with the largest and most influential kingdom in the Arab world could change the face of the Middle East, open new trade routes, strengthen the moderate camp against Iran, and grant Israel unprecedented legitimacy in the region. But there is one price that Israel must not agree to pay for this achievement.

Granting Saudi Arabia the ability to develop an independent uranium enrichment capability should set off alarm bells in Jerusalem. According to Reuters, the agreement does not require it to adopt the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which allows for more intrusive inspections, including access to undeclared sites. In this, it differs fundamentally from the agreement the US signed with the UAE, under which Abu Dhabi renounced the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel.

There is nothing wrong with Saudi Arabia's desire to build nuclear reactors for energy purposes. Many countries do this, and Saudi Arabia seeks to diversify its energy sources as part of Vision 2030. The problem begins elsewhere: uranium enrichment is not necessary for operating nuclear power plants. Nuclear fuel can be purchased from other countries, as many nations around the world do.

The difference between a civilian nuclear reactor and an independent enrichment capability is critical. The technology used to enrich uranium to a low level for reactors can — if a political decision is made and the appropriate infrastructure exists — also be used to advance toward fissile material for weapons. Therefore, the debate is not about Saudi Arabia's right to nuclear energy, but about the question of why it needs the most sensitive component of the nuclear fuel cycle.

The fear is not theoretical. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has already said publicly in the past that if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will also have to obtain them. Precisely after the confrontations with Iran and the efforts to prevent Tehran from establishing itself as a nuclear threshold state, it will be difficult to explain why an enrichment capability that is considered dangerous in Iran suddenly becomes legitimate when it comes to Saudi Arabia. Israel cannot base its security policy on the question of who sits in the palace in Riyadh today. Regimes change, leaders are replaced, and alliances are overturned.

An even greater danger is the domino effect. If Saudi Arabia receives American approval for uranium enrichment, why should Turkey renounce a similar capability? Why should Egypt agree to be left behind? Cairo is already building four nuclear reactors in El Dabaa with Russian assistance, with a total capacity of about 4,800 megawatts. Other countries in the region could argue that if Riyadh is allowed to control its fuel cycle, there is no reason why they should be dependent on supplies of enriched uranium from outside.

Normalization will wait. This is precisely where the real danger of the Saudi precedent lies. In the Middle East, the balance of power is determined not only by immediate security needs, but also by prestige and regional status. Erdogan's Turkey has been seeking for years to establish itself as an independent power, and Egypt sees itself as the leader of the Arab world. If Saudi Arabia possesses enrichment technology, the pressure in Ankara and Cairo to obtain a similar capability could increase.

Other Gulf states will also re-examine their situation. This could create a race in which no country declares that it seeks a bomb, but each strives to possess the infrastructure that will allow it to get closer to one when necessary. This is perhaps the most dangerous scenario: not a Middle East with one nuclear power, but an entire region of threshold states, where a decision by one leader could trigger similar decisions by his neighbors in a short time. From here, the road to a Middle East where several countries possess a nuclear threshold capability could shorten.

One can imagine a region where Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey each possess infrastructure that allows it to get relatively close to weapons if a political decision is made. Egypt, too, might at some stage re-examine its policy. In such a case, it would no longer be just a conventional arms race, but a system of mutual suspicion, where any regional crisis could take on a nuclear dimension.

From Israel's perspective, this is a dangerous strategic shift. For decades, Israel has sought to prevent the emergence of a hostile nuclear threat in the Middle East. The possibility of a proliferation of threshold states is dangerous not only because of their current intentions, but because the centrifuges, infrastructure, and knowledge remain even when governments change.

Supporters of the agreement will argue that American cooperation is precisely the best way to monitor the Saudi program. There is logic in this. If Riyadh turns to China or Russia, the ability of American influence might be smaller. But the solution is not opposition to a Saudi civilian nuclear program. The solution is adopting the UAE model: reactors — yes, uranium enrichment and reprocessing — no. Strict international oversight — absolutely. Israel should say this even to its greatest friend, the USA.

Peace with Saudi Arabia is an important strategic goal. It could create a new axis of moderate states, strengthen the Israeli economy, and deepen Iran's isolation. Israel should make a great effort to reach it. But peace agreements are signed with governments, nuclear capabilities remain for generations.

If the price for Saudi Arabia's accession to the Abraham Accords is Israeli acquiescence to uranium enrichment on the kingdom's soil, Israel must be prepared to say no. It is better to wait a few more years for normalization with Riyadh than to wake up in a decade to a Middle East where three or four countries are one political decision away from a military nuclear capability.

Another Abraham Accord would be a historic achievement. Preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East is an existential necessity. When the two goals collide, Israel must not confuse them.

The author is the CEO of Radius 100FM, an honorary consul and deputy dean of the consular corps, president of the Israeli Radio Communication Association, and a former IDF Radio correspondent and NBC television network reporter.